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1. SÜMMARY OF THE EVENT
On monday November 9, 1992 at 5:20 a.m. a major U. V.C.E, occured in the
Gas Plant of the TOTAL refinery's Fluid Catalytic Cracking ünit at La Mede,
France. The origin was a 25 cm2 break in the 8" by-pass of the absorber stripper
column cooler; an amount of about 15 tons of LPG and light naphtha was released
within 10 minutes, covering an area of 14000m2 including Gas Plant, cryogenic,
propene and Merox units betöre being ignited on the FCC main furnace. There
were eight people on shift in the unit: 6 died, one was very seriously injured, and
one slightly injured. The total loss including loss of production is estimated at
600,000,000$. (see figure l)
Direct domino effects resulted from positive and negative overpressures, missiles,
and ground shock: fractures of pipework, tank fires and power Station fire.
Indirect domino effects were the consequence of fire exposure inducing piping
bursting: 5:22 a.m., rupture of the depropanizer head line with consecutive
explosion and fireball. (see photograph of figure 2) 5:26 a.m., explosion of the
debutanizer head line with fireball. Let us mention also the explosions of a LPG
pipeline and a gasoil line. A total of 60 ruptured pipes were observed.
2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The methodological approach developed by the investigation team comprises
4 main steps:
2.1 Gathering evidence
The search for Information involved namely specific data sources:
control room hard copy and electronically stored records: no deviation of
process operating parameters were observed on the 50 measurement records
analyzed;
video tapes from amateurs and newsmedia: 17 fllms collected covering a
period starting at 5h22 a.m. (2 minutes after the first explosion) to 12h00;
record from a gas detector 3 minutes before the explosion;
8th International Symposium Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process
Industries, Anvers, 6-9juin 1995, p. 365-376
Figure 1. Chronology of Events Q epicentre 0 location ofvictims
- 2 -
Flgure 2. 5:22 a.m. second explosion, rupture of the depropanizer head line.
Figure 3. Gas Plant area after explosion and consecutive fires.
- 3 -
more than 1750 photographs from audit team, Professional photographers
and amateurs were collected and expertised;
witnesses Interviews;
missiles mapping;
seismic waves records collected from 21 stations located between 28 km and
409 km from the epicentre.
2.2 Defining potential scenarios
The selection of the potential accident scenarios was based upon four
concepts:
The determination of the explosive mass and the location of the explosion
epicentre extrapolated from the observed damages in both far-fleld and near-
field, using different ways of modeling: multi-energy approach, TNT
equivalency and spherical expanding flame model;
The identification of all potential ignition sources leading to the
determination of the one being the origin of the ignition of the vapour cloud:
the FCC furnace F301 located at 150m from the epicentre;
The exhaustive numbering of the ruptured equipment: 60 fractured pipes and
branch connections, no capacity nor pressure vessel ruptured;
The identification of the ruptured pipes that might generate the main
explosion, using 3 + 5 criteria.
2.3 Investigating the possible scenario
Finally, 4 Systems remained selected for a more complex investigation:
- a soda tank containing accidentally introduced propane,
- the 8" by-pass ofthe absorber stripper cooler,
- a l" brauch connection (guillotine break) located on the 8" line between
cooler and absorber stripper,
- a 3" LPG pipeline.
2.4 Performing the validation ofthe assumptious
To emphasize the most probable sequence and to perform the validation of the
assumptions herewith associated, 5 different tools were used:
2D model Software for dispersion Simulation: gaussian plume model and
dense model. The released vapours are heavier than air: (C3, C4 and light
naphtha); the refinery is located on ground with slop; at the time of the
accident, Pasquill stability class was FQ 5.
Wind tunnel Simulation with a model of the refinery site on a 1/15001 scale,
using Richardson similarity.
Dynamic process modeling of the absorber stripper column for determining
the time associated with process operating parameters deviation.
Simulation in a similar unit in another TOTAL refinery.
Use of metallurgical and mechanical data to confirm the determination of the
primary leak.
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3. INVESTIGATION INTO THE AMOUNT OF FLAMMABLE PRODÜCTS
INVOLVED
Inspection of the accident site is one of the most important steps in gathering
physical evidence. A detailed examination is made to obtain Information on the
apparent origin, the propagation of the explosion and localized damage of the
explosion or fire. In the case of explosion damage analyses, the main goal is the
evaluation of the amount involved, because hereafter it is a very important
criterion to classify possible scenarios. Explosion damage is due to the high and
dynamic pressures generated by the sudden release of energy. However, the
damage analyses include consideration of the following important items:
1. flammable vapour cloud confinement in the Installation
2. explosion pressures, propagation rates and energy release
3. near-fleld effects
4. blast wave or far-field effects.
All these aspects were kept in mind during the damage investigation. A
damage table was set up (see table l). The evaluation of the pressure in the far-
field was made by comparison with tabulated blast wave criteria.
Related to the near-field, some mechanical caiculations were performed. A map
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One may think thafc the damages behind the refinery fence, in particular at
Martigues, were enhenced due to the meteorological conditions at the time of the
explosion. As a first step, the explosion damage analysis allows to determine the
epicentre area of the explosion. This area is defined äs the location where the
pressure was the highest. This epicentre area was located between the propene
unit and the Gas Plant. It is different from the ignition point and from the origin
of the leak, because the explosion pressure depends strongly on the congested
parts on the site. (see photograph of figure 3) As a second step, the examination
of the projection of missiles allows to evaluate the pressure at the epicentre area:
50 to 200 kPa locally. Then, several methods were used to determine the amount
of flammable mixture involved in the explosion: TNT equivalency, multi-energy
method and spherical expanding flame model. For example, the multi-energy
method allows to make some comparison between the congested volume from the
different units and the damages observed. The objective was to obtain the better
curve äs possible to reduce the distance between the curve and the damage points
(see figure 4). Finally, the different methods led to good agreement about the
assessment of the most probable amount of flammable mixture involved in the
explosion. The best estimation was about 5 tons scale of sizes.
4. SELECTION OF THE FRACTURED PIPES POSSIBLY IMPLICATED
WITH THE PRIMARY LEAK
60 fractures of pipework were observed. In order to identify the ones that
might generate the main explosion the following methodological approach based
on 3 + 5 criteria was defined. A first selection was made, discarding three
families of ruptured pipes: •
1. 14 pipes containing products unable to generate an explosion phenomenon
such äs non flammable products (DEA, water, soda) or flammable products
with pressure vapour less than lOhPa at operating temperature (GO, HV fuel,
heavy naphtha).
2. 11 pipes being isolated at the time of the explosion and having a small
capacity.
3. 12 pipes containing flammable products with specific physical conditions:
vapour phase and small pressure (1050hPa).
For such emission sources we have a mass flow of 2,3 kg/s in vapour phase, an
explosive mass of about 2kg and a LEL concentration up to 45m from the
source with stability class Fl.
For the 23 remaining ruptured pipes, 4 criteria correlated with caiculations and
one criterion based upon visual inspection are then applied:
1. vapour mass flow must be superior to 10 kg/s;
2. the LEL of the released gaseous mixture must reach the furnace;
3. 20% of the LEL must be snuffed at the location of the gas detector having
given an alarm 3 minutes betöre the explosion happens;
4. the released mass within the explosion limits must be about several tons;
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Figure 4. Multi-energy approach: correlation with observed damages
corresponding to an hemispherical cloud with a 29m radius.
Figure 5. Ignition source: FCC main furnace.
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5. The physical conditions of the rupture are not a consequence of the main
explosion.
18 fractured pipes were consequently elaminated by criteria l to 4. The five
remaining ruptured pipes were then submitted to criteria 5. Three Systems then
necessitated a more complex analysis:
- 8" by-pass ofthe absorber stripper cooler;
-1" branch connection on the 8" line from the absorber stripper cooler;
- 3" butane pipeline T09.
5. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE LEAKS
Four likely scenarios were considered. The first is related to a leak on the
LPG line T09. When the accident occured, it was isolated and füll of liquid
butane. It presents a bulge-shaped breach (200xl20mm). Owing to the diameter
of the line and the pressure inside it, the order of magnitude of the explosive
amount of gas would be at the most 80kg, the explosive area extending äs far äs
45m. Moreover, witnesses saw the line exploding and metallurgical
investigation led to plastic deformation due to heating. It was thus possible to
discard this hypothesis.
The second scenario is related to C24 tank in which is usually sent the used soda
coming from the refining of propane, butane and gasoline. When used soda is
drained off, hydrocarbons may be accidentally introduced in the tank. The tank
has burnt the day the accident occured. Modeling was performed related to leaks
ofgas through vents or broader holes, according to the maximum propane release
rate that might have been drained to the tank, the maximum explosive mass has
been assessed to about 1,2 tons, the maximum extension of the explosive cloud
being 100m. The case of leak without kinetic energy has been considered too, by
means of a wind-tunnel Simulation äs described below. It was not possible to
guess measurable concentrations in the gas plant. All these reasons led to the
discarding of the scenario.
The two last scenarios are related to the absorber stripper DA101, the first about
a l" branch connection and the second about a breach (800x200mm) on the by-
pass of the EA103 cooler. More complex simulations including wind tunnel and
dynamic process modeling were then used. It was thus possible to emphasize that
the most probable origin of the initial leak was the by-pass äs shown below.
6. IGNITION SOURCE LOCATION
In an unit, the possible ignition sources may be:
an electrical spark due to the rupture extra-current of a circuit, generated by
some manoeuvre,
an open flame like a burner of a furnace,
a mechanical spark,
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hot surfaces the temperature of which being greater than auto-ignition
temperature of the flammable products involved.
In our purpose, the investigation dealt with the electric sources and the F301
furnace. In fact, the mechanical spark was not taken into consideration because
there was no work in progress, nor abnormal Situation in an electrical equipment.
The possibility of an ignition on the hot surfaces of the disaster area was not held
because the auto-ignition temperature of the gases was greater than the
operating temperature of the pipes.
On the other hand, several fmdings were made under the F301 furnace. The
flammable cloud burnt up to the two thirds of the south part of the furnace.
Traces of combustion were found on the external box of the third burner at east.
More, in the direction of the Gas Plant, several burns, were found on the
electrical cabinets and cables indicating the travel of a slow flame front. Several
investigations on the electrical equipment were made in order to justify the
exclusion of this kind of equipment.
Finally, the ignition on the F301 furnace was found to be the only solution that is
consistent with evidence and with the observed traces of combustion. (see
photograph of figure 5).
7. VALIDATION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS
7.1 Wind tunnel Simulation ofthe dispersion ofthe explosive vapour cloud.
The choice of a physical model Simulation was dictated by the difficulty of
reproducing the complexity of flow phenomena on a site such äs La Mede, due to
the lack of available accurate modeis. The experiments were conducted in the
diffusion wind tunnel of EDF's Lyon Engineering Center located in the premises
of the Fluid Mechanics and Acoustics Laboratory ÜRA CNRS 263 of the "Ecole
Centrale de Lyon". This wind tunnel is of the feedback type with venting
downstream of the test facility. The test section measures 14 meters in length,
3.70 meters in width and the height is variable between 2 and 2.50 meters. The
speed inside the test section is continuously adjustable from 0-lOm/s. The model
of the La Mede reflnery site on a l/ISO111 scale, represents the whole of the zone
affected by the explosion and incorporates the potential release points to be
investigated (see photograph of figure 6). The ground incline is perfectiy
reproduced on the model. The physical model study of the dispersion of an
explosive gas cloud heavier than air is performed in Richardson similarity the









g' is the gravity term, pg and pg., L and U are respectively the speciflc masses of
gas and air, the characfceristic length, and speed scales defined in the case of a
continuous gas release at the break of volume flowrate Qv via
O2 1 iL = (^sandü = (Qvg')3.
g
This definition of the Richardson number, used by Köning-LangIo and
Schatzmann (1990) is routinely used for continuous releases in a calm
atmosphere, characterized by wing speeds under l m/s. A different definition is
used for non-zero wind velocities, where the local flow velocity is used to
determine the characteristic scales (Britter and McQuaid 1988). Validation tests,
presented in particular by Köning-LangIo et al (1990) Hall et al (1982) and Y.
Riou (1987), have shown good agreement of the wind tunnel results with those
obtained in situ, mainly at Thorney Island (MC Quaid 1984), Porton (Picknett
1978, 1981) for instantaneous gas releases and at Burro (Koopmann et al 1982),
Maplin Sands (Puttock) et al 1982) and Thorney Island for continuous gas
releases. Instantaneous concentrations are measured by means of a hydrocarbide
analyzer (Cambustion Ltd) the passband of which is about 500 Hz for a 150 mm
sampling probe lenght. The tracer gases used in the wind tunnel are mainly
hydrocarbides whose densities are dose to the considered release conditions. The
main test results for the three scenarios under consideration have shown, despite
the very conservative hypotheses adopted for this Simulation, that the maximum
gas leak from storage tank C24 could not be the cause of the accident, since the
concentration levels reached at the ignition point are far lower than the gas
inflammability limit (LEL). Regarding the two absorber stripper cooler EA 103
scenarios, the tests showed that scenario break at the by-pass bounds the second
one (failure of l" branch connection). The gas concentrations at the ignition point
(furnace F 301) only reach the LEL for the first scenario. The Simulation made
for this scenario by east wind led to the results dosest to the evidence. Note in
particular that the gas doud reaches both the gas detector P80-1 and the ignition
source. The dispersion and transport of the gas doud particularly made it
possible first, to characterize the progression of the explosive mixture äs far äs
the presumed ignition source and, secondly, to evaluate the average time to reach
the ignition point by the LEL at 675 ±110 seconds for 98 simulations, compatible
with the estimations made elsewhere (see figure 7).
7.2 Dynamic process modeling of the absorber stripper
If one of the breaks is the origin of the accident, it must be demonstrated that,
during the estimated release duration about 10 minutes,
1. the break can release a sufficient mass of product
2. the break is not inducing variations of the operating parameters, äs oberved
on the hard copy stored records.
To verify both criteria a realistic dynamic process modeling of the absorber
stripper column has been performed by the IFP (Institut Francais du Petrole) in
order to determine the time associated with process operating parameters
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Figure 6. Wind tunnel Simulation: 1/150^ scale model of the zone affected by the
explosion.
Figure 7. Wind tunnel Simulation: dispersion and transport of the vapour cloud
(8" by-pass case) äs a function oftime,
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deviations. This evaluation technique combines physical modeis for quantifying
release outflow with transfer functions calibrated by mean of test done on a
similar column in another TOTAL refinery. From that dynamic Simulation it has
been demonstrated that for outflow opening areas less than 35cm2, pressure
variations are not detectable before a 30 minutes period; for hole areas less or
equal to 25cm2, no noticeable variations is observed for the absorber bottom
level, for the head vapour flow and for the bottom liquid flow, if the release lasts
less than 10 minutes. Taking into account the operating process conditions at
the time of the accident, this dynamic process Simulation has shown that within
10 minutes:
1. 12 tons of hydrocarbons might have been released through a 25cm2 break
area, the third part of this amount being vaporized.
2. Through the l" branch connection 5 tons might have been released, thus
discarding this branch connection scenario.
8. CONCLUSIONS
From the experience gained at La Mede, it was possible to point out the
following recommendations to perform an accident investigation:
1. It is required for companies to develop incident investigation System
involving top management.
The Chairman of the investigation team has to be a manager experienced in
operating production units, to know technology and process of the implicated
kind ofunit and, fmally, has to be aware of safety aspects.
2. An investigation team has to be constituted with internal and external multi-
disciplinary experts (fluid mechanics, detonics, mechanics, electricity, •
metallurgy, industrial risk analysis, process control...).
3. It is necessary to visit the site äs soon äs possible to identify and secure area
of interest and photograph the maximum of exhibits.
4. It is recommended to associate operators and maintenance crew to the
investigation, particularly when gathering evidences and trying to
demonstrate the feasibility of scenarios.
5. Validation of the assumptions must be performed by using different modeling
and Simulation approaches in order to point out the most probable root cause
event.
6. In order to increase the knowledge in learning from accidents, it would be
usefui to collect äs precisely äs possible and disseminate all the relevant
Information: lectures, papers, investigation report with non restricted
distribution... .
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